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Abstract 
Leadership change formed the backdrop to the 2010 Australian federal election, 
with the replacement of Kevin Rudd as prime minister by Julia Gillard, the country’s 
first female prime minister. This article uses the 2010 Australian Election Study, a 
post-election survey of voters, to examine patterns of voter defection between the 
2007 and 2010 elections. The results show that the predominant influence on 
defection was how voters rated the leaders. Julia Gillard was particularly popular 
among female voters and her overall impact on the vote was slightly greater than that 
of Tony Abbott. Policy issues were second in importance after leadership, particularly 
for those moving from the Coalition to Labor, who were concerned about health and 
unemployment. Labor defectors to the Greens particularly disliked Labor’s education 
policies. Overall, the results point to the enduring importance of leaders as the 
predominant influence on how voters cast their ballot. 
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Leadership Change, Policy Issues and Voter Defection 
in the 2010 Australian Election 
Each election is different, but the Australian federal election held on 21 August 
2010 had a number of characteristics that set it apart from its predecessors. First, 
Labor’s popular prime minister, Kevin Rudd, was dismissed from office by his own 
party just two months before the election was held. This was the first time that Labor 
had dismissed a prime minister during their first term in office. Second, Rudd’s 
replacement was Julia Gillard, who made history by being Australia’s first female 
prime minister. And third, despite the Labor government’s successful navigation of the 
global financial crisis, Labor failed to win an overall majority and the election produced 
the first hung parliament since 1940. After 17 days of tense negotiations, Labor 
eventually formed a minority government with the support of four independents and the 
Greens.  
Any one of these characteristics would have made the 2010 election distinctive, 
but the combination of all three make the election unique. Nevertheless, the 
preoccupation with leadership change hides an essential continuity with previous 
elections. Like previous election campaigns in Australia and internationally, the parties’ 
activities were dominated by stage managed events, involving the party faithful and 
organized around sound bites designed to appeal to the mass media (for a review, see 
Semetko, 2007). Voters responded by seeing fewer differences between the major 
parties,1 and by supporting minor parties in increasing numbers. Indeed, minor parties 
and independents received 18.4 percent of the first preference vote in the House of 
Representatives, their best performance since 2001. The Greens, who made up the bulk 
of the minor party vote, won their largest vote ever, securing 11.8 percent of the lower 
house first preference vote (see Miragliotta, 2010).2 
This article outlines the background to the election and examines the dynamics of 
the campaign. Several explanations for the outcome are tested. The data come from the 
2010 Australian Election Study (AES) survey, a national survey of public opinion 
conducted immediately after each federal election.3 In addition, we examine the longer-
term trends with respect to some of the key factors in the election, in order to place the 
election within a long-term political perspective. The article is concerned with the 
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attitudinal factors that influenced the vote in the 2010 election; an analysis of the 
socioeconomic factors that underpinned the vote for the major parties can be found in 
Bean and McAllister (2011). 
The Flow of the Vote 
Labor won the 2007 election with a comfortable majority and recent electoral 
history would have suggested that the party should have secured a second term without 
much difficulty. However, throughout the early part of 2010 and with an election due 
by the end of the year, the two major parties were almost neck-and-neck in the polls. 
This close race changed on 27 April 2010 when the prime minister, Kevin Rudd, 
announced that the government would delay the implementation of its planned Carbon 
Pollution Reduction Scheme (CPRS) until 2012 (Pietsch and McAllister, 2011). The 
legislation to implement the CPRS had previously been rejected in the Senate, creating 
the potential for a double dissolution election. Various groups had argued that there 
should be an election on the issue, and Rudd’s announcement that he would delay the 
CPRS rather than call an election on the issue was condemned by environment groups 
and popular movements such as GetUp! 
Figure 1 shows that in the Newspoll survey immediately preceding the decision, 
Labor’s support stood at 43 percent; following the announcement of the delay in the 
CPRS, Labor support dropped to 35 percent. Labor support remained at that level until 
Kevin Rudd was replaced by Julia Gillard as Labor prime minister on 24 June. Most of 
the defections from Labor went to the Greens, and Figure 1 shows clearly that after 
April 2010, while the Coalition vote remained relatively stable, the Green vote 
increased, peaking at 16 percent in May 2010. The patterns of support in Figure 1 also 
demonstrate that the abandonment of the CPRS marked a turning point in Labor’s 
fortunes, and made it unlikely that the party would win the election outright. The 
decision also marked the start of a major decline in Rudd’s popularity, and was a key 
reason for his replacement as prime minister by Gillard.  
[Figure 1 about here] 
The election was called on 17 July, just over four weeks after the leadership 
change. There had been widespread speculation that the election would be called soon 
after Gillard became prime minister, in order to capitalize on the short honeymoon 
period that every new leader enjoys. In the Newspoll survey immediately prior to the 
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change of leadership, Labor support stood at 35 percent of the first preference vote; in 
the poll immediately following the leadership change, Labor support gained 7 
percentage points, to 42 percent.4 In the first two weeks of the election campaign Labor 
led the Coalition in the first preference vote. However, Labor’s repetitive emphasis on 
the slogan ‘moving forward’ proved unpopular with voters; for example, in her election 
announcement, Gillard repeated the phrase no less than 24 times in five minutes leading 
to the criticism that she was talking down to voters.5 
The result of the election was largely in line with the predictions of the opinion 
polls from early August onwards, which showed a Coalition advantage in the first 
preference vote of about 7 percent, which equated to a two-party preferred vote of 50 
percent each for Labor and the Coalition.6 The election result gave Labor 50.1 percent 
of the two–party preferred vote and the Coalition 49.9 percent; both parties secured 72 
seats in the 150 seat House of Representatives. The balance of power was held by six 
crossbenchers, and after 17 days of negotiations, four of them declared their support for 
Labor, thereby allowing Labor to form government. In the Senate, the Greens gained 
four seats giving them the balance of power in the upper house. 
The turnover of the vote between the 2007 and 2010 elections in Table 1 shows 
that the Coalition was the most effective party in retaining the support of voters 
between the two elections.7 A total of 86 percent of Coalition voters in 2007 also 
reported voting for the Coalition in the 2010 election. Of those Coalition voters who 
defected from the Coalition, half reported voting Labor, and half voted Green or other. 
Labor managed to retain the support of 70 percent of its 2007 voters, with 14 percent 
defecting to the Coalition and 12 percent defecting to the Greens. This is the highest 
level of defections from Labor since the AES commenced in 1987, and higher even 
than the figure of 26 percent defections in 1990, when Labor also suffered a significant 
vote shift to the Greens (McAllister, 2011: Figure 1.5). By contrast, the Greens retained 
the vote of two-thirds of their 2007 supporters, the highest figure the party has recorded 
since it began to contest elections. 
Table 1: The Turnover of the House of Representatives’ Vote, 2007-2010 
 2007 Vote 
 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 Lab Lib-Nat Green Others Non-voter 
2010 Vote      
 4
  Lab 70 7 23 12 38 
  Lib-Nat 14 86 4 29 30 
  Green 12 3 66 15 30 
  Others 4 4 7 44 2 
 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
  Total 100 100 100 100 100 
  (N) (958) (830) (118) (48) (60) 
‘In the federal election for the House of Representatives on Saturday 21 August, 
which party did you vote for first in the House of Representatives?’  ‘In the last 
federal election in 2007, when Labor was led by Kevin Rudd and the Liberals by 
John Howard, which party got your first preference then in the House of 
Representatives election’? 
Source 2010 Australian Election Study. 
A large part of Labor’s problem in the 2010 election—as in every election since 
2001, when the Greens first became a significant part of national elections—was a two-
way pattern of defections among those who had voted Labor in the previous election. 
Labor lost votes to the Coalition on the one hand, and to the Greens on the other. By 
contrast, the Coalition parties had to deal just with defections primarily to Labor. As in 
past elections, most of the Green votes returned to Labor through preferences. For 
example, when asked the eventual destination of their House of Representatives vote in 
2010, 73 percent of Green voters said that their vote returned to Labor, 10 percent said 
that their vote went to the Coalition, and 17 percent did not know. This is almost 
exactly the same pattern as occurred in 2007, when Green voters said that 75 percent of 
their votes eventually went to Labor.8 Thus, while around one in 10 voters cast a ballot 
for the Greens, around three out of every four of those votes eventually ended up with 
Labor, thus minimizing the overall defections from the party. 
The Election Campaign  
The issues that were debated during the campaign revolved very much around the 
economy, border protection and climate change, with each benefiting one or other of 
the parties. Labor sought to capitalize on the relatively strong performance of the 
economy during the global financial crisis (GFC). The government attributed this 
strong performance to its stimulus package, which involved spending over $50 billion 
on infrastructure development and giving a cash ‘tax bonus’ to eligible taxpayers 
(Makin, 2010). In total, the stimulus package amounted to 2.6 percent of GDP during 
the 2008-2010 planning period, double that of the next highest spenders among the 
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OECD countries (Wettenhall, 2011: 79). In addition, the government was able to argue 
that the Australian banking system had been better regulated than its overseas peers, 
therefore avoiding the spectacular banking failures and near-failures that had occurred 
in many other countries. 
Labor, however, did not benefit from the emphasis during the campaign on border 
protection and climate change. The Rudd Labor government elected in 2007 introduced 
a number of asylum seeker policy reforms. First, the government abolished temporary 
protection visas for asylum seekers which meant that asylum seekers, if granted refugee 
status, could apply for a permanent visa. Second, children were no longer allowed to be 
detained. Third, the government abandoned the so-called ‘Pacific Solution’ for asylum 
seekers, whereby refugees were detained on small Pacific islands while their claims 
were processed, rather than being permitted onto the Australian mainland, where they 
had access to legal redress if their claims were rejected. 
The Coalition argued that it was the ‘Pacific Solution’ that drastically reduced the 
number of refugees arriving by boat: between 2002 and 2008 a total of 18 boats arrived, 
carrying 301 people. However, with the change in policy, between 2008 and the end of 
2010 a total of 202 boats carrying no less than 10,940 people arrived in Australian 
waters to seek asylum (Phillips and Spinks, 2011). This is a level of illegal arrivals 
matched only by the period following the end of the Vietnam War. On the whole, the 
majority of Australian voters have preferred tougher asylum seeker policies. For 
example, since 2001, Table 2 shows that a majority of voters have consistently 
favoured turning asylum seeker boats back. In the 2010 AES, for example, 52 percent 
favoured turning the boats back, while just 29 percent disagreed, and 19 percent had no 
view. 
Table 2: Attitudes Towards Turning Asylum Seeker Boats Back, 2001-2010 
 2001 2004 2010 
Strongly agree 37 29 30 
Agree 25 26 22 
Neither  18 18 19 
Disagree 12 17 17 
Strongly disagree 8 10 12 
 ---------------------------------------------------------------------- 
  Total 100 100 100 
  (N) (1,967) (1,715) (2,057) 
‘Here are some statements about general social concerns. Please say 
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whether you strongly agree, agree, disagree or strongly disagree with each 
of these statements … All boats carrying asylum seekers should be turned 
back.’ 
Sources 2001, 2004, 2010 Australian Election Studies. 
Climate change policy has traditionally held an electoral advantage for Labor. 
The previous Howard Liberal government had refused to ratify the Kyoto Protocol, 
which committed developed countries to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions by 5 
percent below 1990 levels in the period between 2008 and 2012. However, the 2007 
AES showed that there was widespread public support for ratifying the Kyoto Protocol, 
with 67 percent saying yes and just 8 percent saying no.9 One of the first acts of the 
Rudd Labor government was to ratify the Kyoto Protocol. However, finding a domestic 
policy solution that would reduce greenhouse emissions proved more difficult. 
Following a protracted process of consultation, including a major report led by an 
economist, Ross Garnaut (Garnaut, 2008), the Rudd Labor government decided to 
postpone until 2012 any decision on legislation to limit carbon emissions (Macintosh, 
Wilkinson and Denniss, 2010). Labor’s equivocation on how to approach climate 
change policy undermined its natural advantage on the issue and opened the way for the 
surge in Green support that occurred in the 2010 election. 
The election campaign was also overshadowed by leadership change, in the form 
of the replacement of Kevin Rudd by Julia Gillard as prime minister. While Rudd 
remained moderately popular with voters, albeit declining from a high level in 2008 
and 2009, his support within the Labor caucus weakened significantly during 2009 and 
2010. The erosion of caucus support had its origins in the abrupt turnaround in climate 
change policy noted above, but also in the way in which he introduced the proposal for 
a resources tax on the mining companies. In particular, the resources tax resulted in a 
damaging public dispute with the major mining companies, who funded a $22m media 
campaign to oppose the tax. In response, the government mounted its own media 
campaign, contradicting Rudd’s own 2007 election commitment to depoliticize 
government advertising which Rudd had previously characterized as ‘a long-term 
cancer on our democracy.’10  
Rudd also maintained a highly centralist leadership style, which focused on the 
micro-management of all aspects of policy and eschewed regular consultation with key 
ministers (Aulich and Evans, 2010; Stuart, 2011). As soon as Labor’s prospects of 
winning the forthcoming election began to recede, many in the Labor caucus wanted to 
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install someone with a more consensual leadership style (Cassidy, 2010; Howes, 2011). 
The opportunity arose when Rudd’s chief of staff began canvassing backbench opinion 
on support for Rudd, a move that incensed Julia Gillard, his deputy, who had until then 
remained a loyal supporter. Once it became clear to Rudd that he did not have sufficient 
support to win a leadership ballot, he resigned, with the promise of a senior ministerial 
position if Labor won the election. 
The manner of Rudd’s replacement, in spite of his modest (and declining) 
popularity, found little public support. Table 3 shows that there was considerable 
sympathy for Rudd’s predicament with just 26 percent of the AES respondents 
approving of the way in which he was replaced by Gillard, while 74 percent 
disapproved. Women were generally more likely to disapprove than men, as were 
residents of Rudd’s home state, Queensland. The Rudd dismissal remained an issue 
throughout the election campaign.  
Table 3: Labor’s Leadership Change 
  
All 
Labor 
partisans 
Coalition 
partisans 
Strongly approve 5 5 5 
Approve 21 32 11 
Disapprove 37 38 33 
Strongly disapprove 37 25 51 
 ------------------------------------------------------- 
  Total 100 100 100 
  (N) (2,042) (753) (808) 
‘Do you approve or disapprove of the way the Labor Party handled 
the leadership change in June of this year, when Julia Gillard 
replaced Kevin Rudd?’ 
Source 2010 Australian Election Study. 
The voters saw the main issues that mattered to them during the election 
campaign mainly in terms of health and Medicare, the management of the economy, 
and education. The remaining issues, ranging from global warming to population 
policy, attracted substantially less than one in ten mentions. Even the resources tax, 
which has been such an emotional topic in the run-up to the election and had helped to 
undermine Kevin Rudd’s prime ministership, attracted just 3 percent mentions as a first 
mentioned issue, and 4 percent as a second mentioned issue. Moreover, there was 
relatively little change between the two elections in the distribution of the issues that 
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mattered to voters. Health and education both increased slightly in importance 
compared to 2007, reflecting a long-term trend. As the economy has generally 
performed well, first-order economic issues such as unemployment, interest rates or 
taxation have all declined in importance, while the importance of second-order 
economic issues such as health and education have increased markedly. 
Table 4: The Main Election Issues 
 First and second 
mentioned issues 
(2007 in parentheses) 
 
Party closest to 
own view 
 ------------------------------------------ --------------------------------------------------------- 
  
First 
 
Second 
 
Labor 
 
Coalition
No diff, 
don’t know 
(Labor-
Coalition)
Health, Medicare 23 (+2) 21 (+4) 36 27 37 (+9) 
Economic management 21 (na) 12 (na) 27 37 36 (-10) 
Education 13 (+2) 13 (-1) 41 24 35 (+17) 
Global warming 8 (+1) 5 (-4) 33 22 45 (+11) 
Taxation 7 (-4) 9 (+2) 27 33 40 (-6) 
Interest rates 7 (0) 8 (+2) 19 29 52 (-10) 
Refugees, asylum seekers 6 (na) 9 (na) 21 38 41 (-17) 
Environment 5 (-3) 7 (-3) 33 20 47 (+13) 
Unemployment 3 (+1) 5 (+2) 30 23 47 (+7) 
Resources tax 3 (na) 4 (na) 28 33 39 (-5) 
Industrial relations 3 (-13) 3 (-5) 36 27 37 (+9) 
Population policy 1 (na) 4 (na) 20 25 55 (-5) 
 ------------------------------------------  
Total 100 100    
(N) (1,911) (1,887)    
‘Still thinking about the same 12 issues, which of these issues was most important to you and your 
family during the election campaign? And which next?’  ‘Still thinking about these same issues, 
which policies—the Labor Party’s or the Liberal-National coalition’s—would you say come closest 
to your own views on each of these issues?’ 
Sources 2007, 2010 Australian Election Studies. 
The second part of Table 4 shows which of the two major parties the voters 
preferred on each of the 12 issues. The respondents saw the largest differences between 
the parties on education, the management of the economy, and industrial relations; the 
smallest differences emerged on population policy and interest rates, with more than 
half seeing no difference between the parties or saying that they did not know. Labor 
enjoyed the largest advantages on education (17 percentage points), the environment 
(13 points) and global warming (11 points), while the Coalition was preferred on 
refugees and asylum seekers (17 percentage points) and economic management and 
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interest rates (10 points each). These differences provide a succinct measure of the 
extent to which a particular issues benefited one or other party. They show that, overall, 
no single party dominated the issue agenda; across the 12 issues, 29.3 percent favoured 
Labor, and 28.2 percent favoured the Coalition. In summary, then, the issue agenda did 
not favour one or other party. 
Many of the policy issues canvassed during an election campaign are raised in the 
now traditional leaders’ debate.11 The 2010 debate between the two party leaders, Julia 
Gillard and Tony Abbott, took place on 25 July; the format followed the pattern of all 
of the debates that have been held from 1998 onwards (for an account, see Senior, 
2008). First, just one debate was held, rather than two as occurred in 1993 and 1996. 
Second, the debate involved the two major party leaders and excluded the Greens. 
Third, the debate took place barely a week after the election had been called, and 
almost four weeks before polling day. This is a pattern established under the Howard 
Liberal government, and was designed to accommodate John Howard’s consistently 
poor performance in the debates.12  
The formal, stylized debates that have characterised recent elections have 
attracted fewer and fewer viewers. In 2004, just 35 percent of voters said that they 
watched the debate between John Howard and Mark Latham, the lowest figure that has 
been recorded since 1990. This compares with 71 percent who said that they watched at 
least one of the two debates between Paul Keating and John Hewson in 1993. In 2010, 
47 percent reported watching the leaders’ debate, almost the same proportion as 
watched the 2007 debate. Table 5 shows that voters were more likely to see Gillard as 
having won the debate, with 37 percent saying that she performed better in the debate, 
compared to 22 percent who said that Abbott performed better. However, four out of 
every 10 voters saw the debate as a draw.13 
Table 5: The Televised Leaders’ Debate 
  
All 
Labor 
partisans 
Coalition 
partisans 
Gillard much better 10 19 2 
Gillard better 27 44 10 
About equal 40 33 43 
Abbott better 18 4 35 
Abbott much better 4 0 10 
 ------------------------------------------------------- 
  Total 100 100 100 
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  (N) (1,959) (753) (764) 
‘Did you watch the televised debate between Julia Gillard and Tony 
Abbott on Sunday 25 July? From what you saw or what you heard or 
read about it, who do you think performed better in the debate—
Gillard or Abbott?’  
Source 2010 Australian Election Study. 
Labor partisans were more likely to see their own leader as the winner of the 
debate compared to Coalition partisans. A total of 63 percent of Labor partisans 
considered that Gillard had performed better, compared to 45 percent of Coalition 
partisans who thought that Abbott had performed better. There was also a significant 
gender effect in how the leaders were rated in the debate. As Australia’s first female 
prime minister, and therefore the first woman to appear in a leaders’ debate during a 
national election, Gillard gained disproportionately more support among women. 
Among women, 42 percent thought that Gillard had performed better, compared to 32 
percent of men. There was a smaller gender effect for men supporting Abbott, 
amounting to 5 percentage points.  
Even by the standards of recent election campaigns, the 2010 campaign was a 
lacklustre affair. Both parties eschewed any detailed discussion of policy and 
announcements were designed to minimize risk and maximize their utility for the mass 
media. This is what Lindsay Tanner, a former Labor minister, has referred to as ‘focus 
groups, spin, presentation, look like you're doing something, announceables nonsense’ 
(Tanner, 2011).14 Voters responded to the election campaign by showing less interest. 
In principle, the emergence of two new leaders and the policy debates over the previous 
year, on climate change, the mining tax and how to address the GFC, should have 
generated much public interest. In practice, the reverse was the case and the AES found 
that just 34 percent said that they had a ‘good deal’ of interest in the election, compared 
to 40 percent in 2007. 
The Party Leaders 
The trend towards the personalization of politics, a shift that has been fuelled by 
the mass media and assiduously promoted by the parties, means that the party leaders 
represent a key element within the election campaign. A charismatic leader can draw 
support away from their opponents, rally the faithful, and effectively communicate the 
party’s policy message. Equally, a lacklustre leader can harm the party’s election 
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prospects. The parties have responded to these changes by ruthlessly replacing leaders 
who consistently rate poorly in the polls and who fail to deliver electoral success. For 
example, between 1983 and 1996, when the Liberals were in opposition, they had five 
leaders15 with an average tenure of just 28 months. During Labor’s lengthy period in 
opposition between 1996 and 2007, their four leaders16 were in office for an average 
period of just 32 months. These are periods of tenure which barely cover one election 
cycle.  
Since 2007, the Liberals have experienced considerable leadership turmoil, with 
Brendan Nelson lasting just 10 months as leader, and his successor, Malcolm Turnbull, 
lasting just 15 months. Nelson suffered from some of the lowest poll ratings ever 
recorded by any party leader. He had also only narrowly won the Liberal leadership by 
three votes against Turnbull in 2007, and he was unable to broaden this narrow support 
base due to his poor performance. Turnbull’s equally short period as leader was 
dramatically brought to an end by the ‘Ozcar affair’, when he accused Kevin Rudd and 
Wayne Swan of using their positions to advantage a friend (see Simms, 2009; 
Singleton, 2010). Turnbull’s allegations were subsequently found to have been based 
on forged documents, fatally undermining his leadership (see Crabb, 2009).  
Throughout the period following the 2007 election and leading up to the 2010 
election, Figure 2 shows that Kevin Rudd maintained a very substantial advantage over 
Brendan Nelson and then his successor, Malcolm Turnbull, as preferred prime minister. 
Rudd’s popularity declined after his election in 2007, as would be expected, but the 
decline was much less than has been the case with other prime ministers (McAllister, 
2003). Until Tony Abbott replaced Turnbull, neither Turnbull nor Nelson had attracted 
more than one in four voters who viewed either leader as their preferred prime minister. 
Tony Abbott’s accession to the Liberal leadership brought a rise in public support, 
peaking at 37 percent in mid-June, just prior to Rudd’s replacement by Julia Gillard, 
and peaking again in the days immediately before the election. In the last Newspoll 
survey before the election, 50 percent preferred Julia Gillard as prime minister and 37 
percent preferred Tony Abbott. 
[Figure 2 about here] 
The greater popularity of Gillard over Abbott is also reflected in the 2010 AES. 
Using a zero to 10 thermometer  scale, Gillard scored a mean of 4.89, compared to 4.26 
 12
for Abbott. By contrast, Kevin Rudd was more popular than any of the other party 
leaders, perhaps reflecting some popular sympathy for the manner of his dismissal, 
scoring 5.01 on the scale. The leader of the Greens, Bob Brown, was the least popular 
of the party leaders, at 4.10.17 There was a significant gender effect in support for all 
four of the leaders in Table 6. As the first female prime minister, Gillard received 
substantially stronger endorsement among women voters, as did Kevin Rudd. Tony 
Abbott was more popular among male voters, while Bob Brown was more popular 
among women.  
Table 6: Gender Differences in Leaders’ Popularity (Means) 
 (All) Male Female (t-test) (N) 
Julia Gillard (4.89) 4.45 5.32 (6.486, p<.000) (2,038) 
Kevin Rudd (5.01) 4.80 5.22 (3.112, p=.002) (2,028) 
Tony Abbott (4.26) 4.48 4.04 (3.198, p=.001) (2,032) 
Bob Brown (4.10) 3.75 4.45 (5.433, p<.000) (2,021) 
‘Using a scale from 0 to 10, please show how much you like or dislike the party leaders. If you 
don't know much about them, you should give them a rating of 5.’ 
Source 2010 Australian Election Study. 
The Economy 
The Australian economy has grown consistently since the recession of the early 
1990s. Since September 1991, the economy has grown in each successive quarter, with 
the exception of three quarters. This is the longest period of sustained economic growth 
for at least a century and exceeds that experienced by any other developed country.18 
The economy also weathered the global financial crisis with relatively few difficulties. 
In the 2008-09 financial year the economy grew by 1.2 per cent, the highest of any 
OECD country. The January 2010 unemployment rate of 5.3 percent was lower than 
that of any major advanced economy, with the exception of Japan, and remained below 
6 percent during the whole period of the GFC. Voters have responded to these benign 
economic conditions by maintaining their concern with health and Medicare rather than 
with the management of the economy, as Table 4 illustrated earlier. To an important 
extent, then, the Labor government had not received any substantial credit from voters 
for navigating through the GFC.  
Since 1998 the AES has been tracking whether voters considered that 
unemployment, taxes and prices had increased or decreased since the previous election. 
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As Figure 3 shows, since 2004 a minority have believed that these measures of poor 
economic performance have increased. In 2001, for example, at the time of the 2000-01 
economic slowdown, 45 percent believed that unemployment had increased. By 
contrast, in 2007, at the height of the resources boom, just 9 percent took that view. Of 
course, that proportion increased in 2010 although the absolute increase in 
unemployment was relatively small.19 Compared to previous periods, voters see 
relatively few changes in the economic conditions that could affect their everyday 
living standards. 
Figure 3: Perceptions of Economic Changes Since Previous Election, 1998-2010 
 
‘Thinking back to the Federal election in 2007, when Kevin Rudd won against John 
Howard, would you say that since then the following have increased or fallen?’  
Sources 1998-2010 Australian Election Studies.  
Another indicator of the changing economic sentiments of the electorate is how 
far voters view government policy as having influenced economic conditions over the 
past year, and their expectations of the government’s impact on the economy over the 
future year. Figure 4 shows that in the 1990s voters generally saw the government as 
increasingly likely to have had a positive effect on the economy over the previous year, 
but they were much more optimistic about the government’s impact in the coming year. 
From 1998 onwards, with better economic performance, that relationship has reversed, 
and voters were more favourable to the government’s impact on the economy over the 
past year. Better economic conditions clearly caused voters to change their views about 
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the government’s impact on the economy, and to attribute some of the growth to 
government policies. However, voters were less optimistic about what impact the 
government would have in the future year. 
Figure 4: Government Effect on the Economy, 1990-2010 
 
‘Compared with 12 months ago, would you say that the Federal government's policies 
have had a good effect, a bad effect, or that they really have not made much difference 
to the financial situation of your household? And what effect do you think they have 
had on the general economic situation in Australia as a whole? Compared to now, what 
do you think the financial situation of your household will be in 12 months time? And 
what do you think the general economic situation in Australia as a whole will be in 12 
months time?’ 
Sources 1990-2010 Australian Election Studies.  
Between 2007 and 2010—with the global financial crisis intervening—there was 
virtually no change in public opinion towards the government’s effects on the 
performance of the economy. The Labor government’s response to the GFC, in the 
form of the massive stimulus package, helped to dampen the effects of the crisis on the 
domestic economy. However, this clearly did not benefit the government electorally, to 
the chagrin of many Labor strategists. Part of the explanation may have been the 
trenchant opposition to the package by the Liberals, who argued that it was too large 
and that it would take many years to pay off. Tony Abbott, for example, asked: ‘why do 
you need a program that lasts longer than the First World War to save jobs in a crisis 
that lasted, in its intense phase, for just eight weeks?’ 20 Another explanation may have 
been that voters had not directly experienced the crisis that Labor claimed to have 
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avoided; as Karl Bitar, the national secretary, argued, ‘We protected people’s jobs 
which they didn’t lose and we kept Australia out of a recession we didn’t feel the 
impact of.’21 The result was that the economy had relatively few electoral consequences 
in 2010, either positive or negative, for the major parties.  
Evaluating the Explanations 
There were, therefore, a variety of factors working to influence the outcome of 
the 2010 election, from policy issues to leadership change. Since our interest is in those 
voters who shifted their votes, we seek to identify the reasons why certain groups of 
voters defected from their choice at the previous 2007 election. In the flow of the vote 
presented earlier in Table 1, we identified three main movements of voters: from Labor 
to the Coalition; from Labor to the Greens; and from the Coalition to Labor. In order to 
evaluate why these voters changed their preference, Table 7 calculates three logistic 
regression equations which predict defection.22  
The results show that for voters who defected from Labor, either to the Coalition 
or to the Greens, leadership was the major motivation for their change. For those 
moving to the Coalition, an unfavourable rating of Gillard and a favourable rating of 
Abbott were important, with Gillard’s impact being slightly greater than that of Abbott. 
Among previous Labor voters moving to the Greens, a favourable rating of Bob Brown 
was by far the most important leadership factor, with a dislike of both Gillard and Rudd 
being a much less important element in their decision. Although Brown was the least 
popular of the party leaders across the electorate, he held a particular attraction for 
Labor defectors. The campaign issues were second in importance for both groups of 
Labor defectors. For those defecting to the Coalition, preferring Coalition policies on 
education and industrial relations were important. For those defecting to the Greens, the 
main issue was education. 
Table 7: Evaluating the Explanations 
 Parameter estimates (standard errors) 
 Labor 
to Coalition 
Labor 
to Greens 
Coalition 
to Labor  
Issues (prefers Labor policy)    
  Health, Medicare —ns— —ns— .50** (.21) 
  Management of the economy —ns— —ns— .58*   (.27) 
  Education -.35** (.13) -.35** (.11) —ns— 
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  Global warming —ns— —ns— .67*   (.34) 
  Environment —ns— —ns— —ns— 
  Taxation —ns— —ns— —ns— 
  Interest rates —ns— —ns— .49*   (.26) 
  Refugees, asylum seekers —ns— —ns— —ns— 
  Environment —ns— —ns— —ns— 
  Unemployment —ns— —ns— .65** (.28) 
  Resources tax -.31*   (.14) —ns— —ns— 
  Industrial relations —ns— —ns— —ns— 
  Population policy —ns— —ns— —ns— 
Gillard better in leaders’ debate —ns— —ns— —ns— 
Disapproved of Rudd dismissal —ns— .52** (.20) -1.11*   (.50) 
Leaders’ Ratings    
  Gillard -.39** (.10) -.23** (.07) .55** (.22) 
  Rudd —ns— -.21** (.07) —ns— 
  Abbott .32** (.08) —ns— -.27*   (.15) 
  Brown —ns— .42** (.07) -.40*   (.17) 
Economy     
  Performed better past 12 months  —ns— —ns— —ns— 
  Government good effect on economy —ns— —ns— —ns— 
  Economy better next 12 months .61*  (.27) .47*  (.20) —ns— 
  Government good effect on 
  economy next 12 months 
—ns— —ns— —ns— 
  Unemployment increased since 2007 —ns— —ns— -1.10** (.41) 
  Prices increased since 2007 —ns— —ns— —ns— 
  Taxes increased since 2007 —ns— —ns— .97*   (.44) 
Controls    
  Gender —ns— —ns— —ns— 
  Age —ns— -.02*  (.01) —ns— 
 --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Constant 3.47 -3.03 -8.04 
Nagelkerke R-squared .65 .37 .75 
(N) (805) (779) (768) 
** significant at p<.01, *p<.05. 
Logistic regression analysis showing parameter estimates and standard errors predicting voter 
defection in the specified direction. See footnote 28 for details of coding. Only effects for variables 
significant at p<.05 or better are shown. 
Source 2010 Australian Election Study. 
The importance of education to both groups of Labor defectors is significant, 
particularly those defecting to the Greens, who might have been thought to have been 
motivated by climate change and the environment. While explanations for this finding 
are speculative, the concern over education may reflect the controversial management 
of Labor’s Building the Education Revolution, with allegations of over-spending and 
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poor workmanship on buildings. Julia Gillard was also personally associated with the 
introduction of league tables for schools’ performance, a policy that was strongly 
opposed by the teaching unions. Moreover, most teaching unions, despite their historic 
ties with Labor, viewed Green education policies more favourably.23  
There is a different pattern among Coalition voters who defected to Labor. 
Among this group of voters, their evaluations of the issues rather than the leaders was 
the predominant motivation, with health and Medicare and unemployment emerging as 
significant. In each case, these defectors preferred Labor policy. Surprisingly, Coalition 
policies on refugees or on the resources tax did not benefit them electorally. While 
leadership was less of a factor among this group, a favourable view of Julia Gillard was 
much more important than dislike of Tony Abbott; indeed, none of the other leadership 
ratings are statistically significant. Was Gillard’s gender a factor in attracting votes 
from the Coalition to Labor? The evidence suggests that it was: when the equation is 
estimated separately for men and women, the parameter estimate for Gillard’s rating 
among women is more than twice the size of the same estimate among men.24  
In addition to leaders’ ratings and campaign issues, several other factors were 
important. Disapproval of Rudd’s dismissal from office was important for Labor 
defection to the Greens, and (to a lesser extent) approval of the dismissal motivated 
those moving from the Coalition to Labor. However, the issue, while important for 
some voters, was less important than either leaders’ evaluations or their views on 
particular policies. There is no evidence that the leaders’ debate shifted votes. Nor was 
the economy especially important, confirming the view that there is only a weak link 
between government popularity and economic performance. Finally, gender did not 
emerge as a factor for any of the three groups (beyond the effect already mentioned), 
and age had a small effect on defections from Labor to the Greens. 
The results confirm the predominant influence of the leaders on the election 
outcome. Of the two main leaders, Gillard was the marginally stronger electoral asset, 
particularly in attracting former Coalition female voters. However, Gillard’s advantage 
as an electoral attraction over Abbott was not substantial. For the Greens, Bob Brown 
was by far their greatest electoral asset in attracting Labor defectors. While issues were 
important in motivating defection, any substantial influence was confined mainly to 
those moving from the Coalition to Labor, where health and unemployment were the 
primary concerns. For Labor voters moving to either the Coalition or the Greens, 
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education was a significant factor. In summary, longer-term factors were more 
important than short-term influences, and leadership was more important than the 
election issues. 
Conclusion 
While the 2010 election was distinctive in a number of ways, it did not attract a 
high level of interest from voters, at least compared to previous elections. It has become 
popular to blame the media for this lack of interest and their alleged tendency to ‘dumb 
down’ policy debate (see Tanner, 2011). However, in many respects it is the parties that 
choreograph the election campaign, and substitute low-risk, largely banal events for 
vigorous debate and spontaneous meetings with ordinary voters. The emphasis of the 
electronic media on the leader means that one slip can undermine a whole campaign.25   
The 2010 election confirms the importance of leaders in attracting defectors from 
the other parties. As Australia’s first female prime minister, Julia Gillard was 
successful in gaining disproportionate support from women who had voted for the 
Coalition in 2007. However, her advantage over Tony Abbott was not substantial; both 
leaders were not especially popular, and if either of them had faced any of the more 
popular leaders of past elections, then leadership could have been decisive in 
determining the outcome. It is tempting to speculate whether the more popular Kevin 
Rudd, if he had remained as prime minister, would have served Labor better in the 
election. Certainly the manner of his dismissal cost Labor defections to the Greens. Bob 
Brown’s popularity among Labor defectors to the Greens shows how effective 
leadership can be in motivating defection. However, for the Greens it poses the 
unenviable problem of putting in place a succession strategy for Brown. 
As in other recent elections, the election issues were very much associated with 
health and education, rather than with economic management, unemployment or 
taxation. The strong performance of the Australian economy over an extended period, 
coupled with the belief that government policies can have only a limited impact on 
economic conditions, in effect made the economy a second-order election issue. The 
2010 election was also notable for the issues that did not emerge as important. Despite 
the Coalition’s emphasis on border protection, they neither gained nor lost votes on the 
issue. Labor lost a small number of votes based on its failed resources tax, but the 
impact was far less than many Labor strategists had feared earlier in the year. And not 
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least, the Greens gained votes not on the environment or on climate change, but from 
disaffection with Labor’s policies on education. Such a result may reflect a maturing of 
Green policies, but it also presents a dilemma in how the party can move beyond its 
environmental and essentially protest vote appeal. 
 20
Endnotes 
                                                 
1  In the 2010 AES, 26 percent of the respondents thought there was a ‘good deal’ 
of difference between the parties. In the 1993 AES the same figure was 44 
percent. 
2  In the 2001 election, the first that the Greens fought as a national party, they 
won 5.0 percent of the lower house vote, 7.2 percent in 2004, and 7.8 percent in 
2007. 
3  The AES is a mail-out/mail-back survey conducted among voters in all states 
and territories. In 2010 an online option was available to the survey 
respondents, and an additional sample was collected online in order to correct 
for an under-representation of younger voters; the overall response rate was 
41.9 percent. The data are weighted to reflect population parameters for gender, 
age, state and vote, giving a final sample size of 2,061. Full details of the survey 
methodology can be found in McAllister and Pietsch (2011: Appendix B). 
4  See http://www.newspoll.com.au/. 
5  Don Watson, Paul Keating’s former speech writer, commented that Gillard was 
speaking as if ‘training a dog’ and treating voters like ‘imbeciles.’ 
http://www.abc.net.au/news/stories/2010/07/19/2958335.htm. Accessed 20 May 
2011. 
6  The final Newspoll survey of the campaign, conducted between 17-19 August, 
predicted a two party preferred vote of 49.8 percent for the Coalition and 50.2 
for Labor, which was within 0.1 percent of the actual result. 
7  There are well documented problems is using recalled vote in surveys (see, for 
example, Wright, 1993), mainly associated with the saliency of the election for 
the respondents. Since the 2007 election represented the election of a new 
government and was therefore of higher saliency, in this case the level of error 
may therefore be reduced lower than would otherwise be the case. In addition, 
the distribution of the recalled vote closely matches that  recorded at the 
election.  
8  A further 12 percent said that their vote went to the Coalition, and 12 percent 
didn't know. In 2004, 78 percent of the Green vote went to Labor, 8 percent to 
the Coalition, and 14 percent didn't know. 
9  The environment minister, Malcolm Turnbull, had argued in cabinet that the 
Howard government should ratify the Kyoto Protocol, saying that it would not 
harm Australian economically. See ‘Turnbull wants to ratify Kyoto: Labor’, The 
Australian, 27 October 2011. 
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10  ‘Another Election Sound Bite Returns to Haunt Mr Rudd.’ The Australian, 31 
May 2010. 
11  The first debate was held in 1984 between Bob Hawke and Andrew Peacock. 
Hawke was generally regarded as having performed badly in the debate and he 
refused to debate John Howard in 1987. Debates have been held continuously 
since 1990 (see McAllister, 2011: Chapter 9; Senior, 2008).  
12  Howard participated in five debates, four as prime minister and one as 
opposition leader. He was viewed by voters as having lost all four as prime 
minister, winning only the 1996 debate with Paul Keating, when he was the 
challenger (McAllister, 2011: Table 9.6).  
13  These estimates are for all voters. Separating out the estimates just for those 
who said that they watched the debate produces no substantive difference in the 
perceptions of who performed better. 
14  The quote comes from http://www.abc.net.au/7.30/content/2011/s3202864.htm. 
Accessed 28 May 2011. 
15  Namely: Andrew Peacock (1983-85, 1989-90), John Howard (1985-89, and 
1995-2007) and Alexander Downer (1994-95). 
16  Kim Beazley was leader twice in this period, between 1996 and 2001, and then 
again between 2005 and 2007. The other leaders were Simon Crean (2001-03) 
and Mark Latham (2003-05). 
17  The leader of the Nationals, Warren Truss, was slightly ahead of Brown, with a 
mean score of 4.12. Pauline Hanson was consistently the least popular leader in 
all of the AES surveys, scoring 2.34 in 1998 (see McAllister, 2011: Table 9.1). 
18  See Ric Battellino, ‘Twenty Years of Economic Growth’. Address to Moreton 
Bay Regional Council, available at http://www.rba.gov.au/speeches/2010/sp-dg-
200810.html#t1. Accessed 25 May 2011. 
19  In January 2009 the unemployment rate stood at 4.5 percent; it peaked at 5.7 
percent in mid-2009, and fell back to under 5 percent. See 
http://www.abs.gov.au/ausstats/abs@.nsf/mf/6202.0. Accessed 26 May 2011. 
20  Sydney Morning Herald, 17 August 2010. 
21  See http://australianpolitics.com/2010/11/09/karl-bitar-national-press-club-
address.html. Accessed 28 May 2011. 
22  The independent variables in Table 7 are coded as follows. Issues: 5=issue 
extremely important and prefers Labor, 4=issue quite or not very important and 
prefers Labor, 3=no difference, 2=issue quite or not very important and prefers 
Coalition,1=issue extremely important and prefers Coalition. Leaders debate: 
5=Gillard much better, 4=Gillard better, 3=no difference, 2=Abbott better, 
 22
                                                                                                                                            
1=Abbott much better. Leadership change: 4=strongly disapprove, 
3=disapprove, 2=approve, 1=strongly approve. Leaders’ ratings are scored from 
zero to 10. Economy performed better: 5=lot better, 4=little better, 3=about the 
same, 2=little worse, 1=much worse. Government good effect: 3=good effect, 
2=not much difference, 1=bad effect. Unemployment, prices, taxation 
increased: 5=increased a lot, 4=increased a little, 3=stayed the same, 2=fallen a 
little, 1=fallen a lot. The correlation matrix was inspected for possible 
multicollinarity between the independent variables, but the highest inter-item 
correlation was 0.61, suggesting that this was not a problem in this case. 
23  For example, the NSW Teachers’ Federation, in evaluating the parties’ policies 
on education, said: ‘The Greens continue to be the political party that best 
supports public education across a range of policy areas.’ See 
http://www.nswtf.org.au/edu_online/140/sorting.html. Accessed 29 May 2011. 
24  The estimate is 1.62 (SE=0.85, p=.056) for women, and 0.62 (SE=0.50, p=.215) 
for men. 
25  The British Labour Party learnt this lesson when Gordon Brown, in the privacy 
of his car and not knowing that he was still being recorded, called a life-long 
Labour voter he had just met ‘bigoted’ for her views about immigrants (Wring 
and Ward, 2010).  
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Figure 1: Voting Intention, January-August 2010 
 
Source http://www.newspoll.com.au.  
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Figure 2: The Popularity of the Major Party Leaders, January 2008-August 2010 
 
The question was: ‘Who do you think would make the better prime minister?’ 
Source http://www.newspoll.com.au.  
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